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I. INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW
This article explores the significance of emerging multidisciplinary
theories about brain function that dictate profound reassessment of
basic lawyering assumptions about human behavior. These emerging
theories indicate that, as human beings, our perceptions and
memories are flawed, and as a result, lawyers work with distorted
information that influences our thinking. 1 This article describes how
the brain functions to create these distortions, how this affects law
practice, and how we can teach students to compensate for these
deficiencies in thinking. 2 I argue that these premises should be
integrated into the teaching of law and lawyering to law students.
Several universal and unconscious dimensions to human behavior
or brain function significantly affect the lawyer’s conscious decisions
and actions. New substantial knowledge about how the brain works
as well as significant scientific attention to the biological basis of the
human capacity for perception and decision-making exists 3 that
1.
2.

3.

See discussion infra Parts II.A–B, II.D.
This article does not address the emerging substantive legal issues that both law
professors and neuroscientists are actively producing critical literature on matters
including ethics, privacy, and evidentiary issues such as lie detection. See, e.g., Henry
T. Greely, Knowing Sin: Making Sure Good Science Doesn’t Go Bad, in CEREBRUM
2007: EMERGING IDEAS IN BRAIN SCIENCE 85, 90–91 (Cynthia A. Read, ed., 2007)
(discussing ethical issues in contemporary neuroscience concerning new
developments being used beyond their intended uses or being used without scientific
justification, the primary ethical concern is the use of neuroscience in lie detection);
Adam J. Kolber, Therapeutic Forgetting: The Legal and Ethical Implications of
Memory Dampening, 59 VAND. L. REV. 1561 (2006) (discussing whether access to
memory dampening drugs should be allowed, prohibited, or severely restricted); Stacy
A. Tovino, Functional Neuroimaging Information: A Case for Neuro
Exceptionalism?, 34 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 415 (2007) (discussing neuroethics and the
confidentiality, privacy, and identity implications of advances in functional magnetic
resonance imaging). These studies document debate about the implications of
neuroscience on the future development of doctrine in areas such as constitutional
law, criminal law, and ethics. Instead, my attention is on how we can implement
more conscious problem-solving skills in the application of law and what the
implications are of doing so.
Although I reference biological capacity, I do not dismiss the common scientific
understanding that human reasoning processes are an intricate association between the
biological basis and social interaction—this association is so tight that the relationship
cannot be disassociated. See, e.g., Antonio Damasio, The Neural Basis of Social
Behavior: Ethical Implications, in DEFINING RIGHT AND WRONG IN BRAIN SCIENCE:
ESSENTIAL READINGS IN NEUROETHICS 175, 175–76 (Walter Glannon, Ph.D., ed.,
2007) [hereinafter DEFINING RIGHT AND WRONG IN BRAIN SCIENCE]. However, this
acknowledgment does not lessen the imperative to understand how the biological
function operates in order to dispel outmoded and incorrect assumptions that lawyers
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explains biological bases underlying human behavior. This article
explores how this knowledge about brain functioning enables law
students to perform more effectively as they acquire the range of
lawyering skills including the fundamentals of fact investigation, fact
analysis, and problem solving in their law school curricula. 4
In section II, I explore the following specific premises of brain
function that affect law practice: (1) we automatically think we know
more than we do; (2) what we believe to be objectively true is not
necessarily so; (3) the objects we perceive are not necessarily as they
appear to be; (4) accurate memory recall is a falsehood; and (5) we
have a structure for creating and storing memory that narrows what
we are able to remember through a process using categorization and
metaphor. I also illustrate how these premises interfere with the clear
thinking lawyers need.

4.

make about themselves and others—that is, about human behavior. For instance, see
Damasio’s discussion of bioregulation as edifice for each individual’s neural system
interacting with the social collective that produces ethical behaviors. Id. at 176.
People are responsible for their actions, their brains are not. MICHAEL GAZZANIGA,
THE ETHICAL BRAIN, 87–102 (2005). I do not discuss the issue of free will since this
reasoning is scientifically accepted, sound, and already intellectually rehashed. Nor
do I address the basic issue of intentionality in that even though we may not
understand the causes of our behavior, humans, nevertheless, act intentionally and
consciously. The individual is capable of minimal rational reality because of the
brain, and that rationality allows for intentionality. See Stephen J. Morse, New
Neuroscience, Old Problems: Legal Implications of Brain Science, 6 CEREBRUM 81,
81–90 (2004), reprinted in DEFINING RIGHT AND WRONG IN BRAIN SCIENCE, supra, at
197.
Paying attention to human behavior does not diminish the reality that individual
human character is a result of many factors other than internal brain function.
Character evolves from the complex development of individual intention and social
interaction. See Damasio, supra note 3, at 175; Morse, supra note 3, at 202. By
“character” I mean the deliberate adoption of values and beliefs that drive conscious
choices and that constitute one’s orientation to external reality. However, core legal
doctrine and lawyering are taught with no more than passing, and often inaccurate,
references to the underlying knowledge of brain function and human behavior. I use
the term “brain science” to reference the multidisciplinary study of human behavior
including neuroscience, which includes both neuro-pyschology and cognitive
psychology, since there is enormous flow and mutual reliance between these fields as
well as among other disciplines such as linguistics, philosophy, neuro-anatomy,
neuro-chemistry, and neuro-economics or behavioral decision theory.
Some
neuroscience is also called “neuro-ethics,” which is defined as the “study of the
ethical, legal, and social questions that arise when scientific findings about the brain
are carried into medical practice, legal interpretations, and health and social policy.”
This term is attributed to William Safire. See Ruth Fischbach & Gerald Fischbach,
Foreword to SANDRA J. ACKERMAN, HARD SCIENCE, HARD CHOICES: FACTS, ETHICS,
AND POLICIES GUIDING BRAIN SCIENCE TODAY, at x–xi (2006).
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In section III, I propose a systematic framework of internal
monitoring called “Intentionality” as a method for lessening the
distortions created by our brains. I advocate that law schools teach
students how their brains function to distort information and how
they can use this Intentionality framework to gain self-awareness to
compensate for this distortion and lessen the adverse effects of our
default assumptions about the functioning of our mental processes.
The Intentionality framework involves a three-step process. 5 This
framework is one of attention that is controlled from the inside. One
way to tear down erroneous mental preconceptions is to pay attention
to the “small thoughts” within us that preface our external reactions. 6
The framework is a repetitive cycle of internal intention to external
attention; external attention to action; and action to reflection. 7 Once
mastered, the cycle becomes more nuanced and recursive. To begin
adoption, the process is deliberate and conscious but as the individual
successfully practices Intentionality, the process becomes habitual
and highly adaptive. 8 My key premise is that following the cycle of
this framework and focusing on these premises about human
behavior leads to improved understanding of external circumstances,
better recognition of the issues to be solved, and greater capacity to
effectively respond to the problem.
In section IV, I explore ways to teach the Intentionality framework
in both classroom dialogue as well as in lawyering or clinical
supervision. 9 Students can apply this framework to incorporate
Intentionality into their broader legal problem-solving analysis.
Using their knowledge of brain functioning, students can explore how
distortions occur and parse apart with increased rigor any legal or fact
analysis.
All three major reports on the state of legal education in the United
States over the past two decades indentify the need to teach law or
lawyering within a reality-based context as well as embedding greater
metacognitive reflection capacity in the law student. 10 Over the past
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.

See discussion infra Part III.
See infra Part III.A (discussing Stage 1 of the Intentionality framework).
See infra Part III.
See infra Part IV (discussing how modeling and structuring can help normalize the
reflection process).
See infra Part IV.
See ROBERT MACCRATE ET AL., A.B.A. SECTION OF LEGAL EDUC. & ADMISSIONS TO
THE BAR, LEGAL EDUCATION AND PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT—AN EDUCATIONAL
CONTINUUM 234–35, 330–33 (1992) [hereinafter MACCRATE REPORT]; ROY STUCKEY
ET AL., BEST PRACTICES FOR LEGAL EDUCATION 121–26 (2007) [hereinafter BEST
PRACTICES FOR LEGAL EDUCATION]; GREGORY S. MUNRO, INSTITUTE FOR LAW SCHOOL
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forty years, law schools have been criticized as lacking the integrated
experience-based curriculum necessary to teach students how to
provide effective and responsible legal services. 11
Scholars,
practitioners, and judges alike have identified the need for
educational institutions that train future legal professionals to pay
more attention to what law students need to learn, how law students
learn best, what teaching methods are most effective, and what duties
the law school has to the profession and the society it serves. 12 From
these observations, significant historical and present-day support has
developed for integrating a reality-based context into teaching law,
lawyering, or both to help students achieve the level of
professionalism that justifies a claim to an exclusive right to engage
in the practice of law. 13 Legal educators have a responsibility to
reevaluate assumptions about how one learns to “think like a lawyer”
and discover new methods of conceptualizing and providing studentcentered legal education.
The MacCrate Report built upon the American Bar Association’s
(ABA) efforts to develop, through a dialogue, an understanding of the
state of professional-skills education in law schools and to determine
whether law school curriculums were adequately preparing students
to perform effectively as lawyers after graduation. 14 The ABA
Council of the Section of Legal Education and Admissions to the Bar
established the Task Force on Law Schools and the Profession:
Narrowing the Gap, which developed a “Statement of Fundamental
Lawyering Skills and Professional Values” (Statement) to define the
lawyering skills and professional values necessary to the
responsibilities of a member of the legal profession (i.e., making
professional judgments or giving legal advice). 15 The Statement is
the subject of the MacCrate Report (Report), Legal Education and
Professional Development—An Educational Continuum. 16 The skills
and values identified in the Statement include litigation and
alternative dispute-resolution procedures; factual investigation;

11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.

TEACHING, OUTCOME ASSESSMENT FOR LAW SCHOOLS 50–52 (2000) [hereinafter
MUNRO].
See BEST PRACTICES FOR LEGAL EDUCATION, supra note 10, at 1, 8–13.
See id. at 9; MUNRO, supra note 10, at 51–56.
See MACCRATE REPORT, supra note 10, at 233–36 (describing the benefits of realitybased clinical programs to the professional development of young lawyers).
See id. at 123–26 (detailing the ABA’s efforts to determine what skills are necessary
for effective legal counseling after graduation from law school).
See id. at xi–xii.
See id. at 7–8 (noting that the MacCrate Report includes the Statement and uses it to
identify the role of law schools in the development of law students).
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striving to promote justice; fairness and morality; striving to improve
the profession; and professional self-development, among others. 17
The Statement understands “professional self-development” as the
commitment to increasing one’s own knowledge and improving one’s
own skills by making use of the process of “reflecting upon and
learning from their lawyering experiences.” 18 The Report states that
this process involves a critical assessment of one’s own
performance—including one’s preparation, the performance itself,
and the identification of practices that will enable replication of
effective components of the performance and prevent recurrence of
ineffective ones. 19 With the hope of encouraging a stronger sense of
ownership in students’ own decision making, the Statement places
more of an emphasis on the student’s individual role in shaping his or
her own legal education to meet their professional goals and the
demands of the profession. 20 The Report concludes that law schools
need to recognize that the task of educating students to assume the
full responsibilities of a lawyer is an ongoing “process that neither
begins nor ends with three years of law school”; rather, a continuum
exists that mandates students develop a capacity for self-reflection
and awareness of their professional practice. 21
The decade following the publication of the MacCrate Report
found bar associations, law schools, and judiciaries formally
convening in more than twenty-five states to discuss the Report’s
findings and recommendations. 22 From these ongoing discussions,
members of the Clinical Legal Education Association (CLEA) in
2001 established a committee of legal practitioners and academics to
create a “Statement of Best Practices for Legal Education.” 23
Professor Roy Stuckey of the University of South Carolina School of
Law was asked to chair the committee. The final report, Best
Practices for Legal Education (Best Practices), developed
collaboratively over six years, advocates that one of the goals of legal
17.
18.
19.

20.

21.
22.
23.

See id. at 138–41.
Id. at pts. II.5.A, IV.A, II.4.D.
See id. at pts. IV.C, II.4.E (“Preparation to handle situations necessarily involves an
ability to deal with more contingencies than turn out to occur. That kind of
preparation is the hallmark of professionalism.”).
See id. at pt. II.4.D (“[S]tudents will be assisted to . . . develop for themselves a
considered long-range educational agenda aimed at attaining professional competence
and eventually excellence.”).
See id. at Introduction.
Robert MacCrate, Esq., Foreword to BEST PRACTICES FOR LEGAL EDUCATION, supra
note 10, at vi.
Id.
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institutions must be to help students acquire the attributes of
effective, responsible lawyers, including “self-reflection and lifelong
learning skills, intellectual and analytical skills, core knowledge of
the law, core understanding of law, professional skills, and
professionalism.” 24 The Report calls for law schools to use best
practices for assessing student learning by first identifying “[t]he
goals of [the] particular assessment . . . to evaluate a student’s
knowledge, behavior (what a student does before and after a learning
experience), performance (ability to perform a task), attitudes and
values” before and after a learning experience. 25 The Report points
out that these goals require different methods to assess each of the
educational objectives trying to be achieved. 26 For example,
assessing a student’s capacity for self-reflection or professionalism
necessitates a different assessment method than for core knowledge
of the law or analytical analysis. 27 The Report calls for more use of
criteria-referenced assessments that determine how well the
individual student has achieved the educational objectives of the
course, rather than normative assessments based on how students
perform in relation to other students. 28 In turn, these assessments are
used to provide students with formative feedback, which the Report
emphasizes should “be the primary form of assessment in legal
education.” 29 The Report builds upon the contemporaneous Carnegie
Report’s findings that contemporary learning theory suggests
educational effort is greatly enhanced by the use of formative
assessment while summative assessments (i.e., tests, grades, etc.) are
“‘devices to protect the public by ensuring basic levels of
competence.’” 30
The Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching’s
report, Educating Lawyers: Preparation for the Profession of Law,
identified effective means of formative assessment as critical to
educating professionals since the goal of professional schools must
be to develop practitioners who are cognizant of what they need to do
24.
25.
26.
27.

28.
29.
30.

Id. at viii, 48; MACCRATE REPORT, supra note 10, at pt. II.5.A.
BEST PRACTICES FOR LEGAL EDUCATION, supra note 10, at 179.
Id. at 181.
See id. at 179–84, 190 (noting that cognitive assessments, such as essay questions and
multiple choice exams, assess learning or knowledge, whereas by actively putting
students in the role of lawyers, educators can assess each student’s performance and
competence, which “not only assess students’ knowledge and capabilities, but also
their professionalism”).
Id. at 243.
Id. at 256.
Id. (quoting WILLIAM M. SULLIVAN ET AL., EDUCATING LAWYERS: PREPARATION FOR
THE PROFESSION OF LAW 189 (2007)).
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to engage in the best practice in their profession and to equip them
with the capacity for self-reflection to pursue expertise—thereby
becoming “‘metacognitive’ about their own learning.” 31 In response,
Best Practices provides various assessment techniques identified by
educators and practitioners, specifically “techniques for assessing
prior knowledge, recall, and understanding,” such as a misconception
or preconception check prior to a simulation or a discussion on a
particular material to uncover prior knowledge or beliefs that may
hinder or block learning. 32
The Intentionality framework that I have developed is such an
assessment technique to assist students in applying a metacognitive
approach to their own learning. 33 It can be used to help law schools
teach students to develop self-awareness and understand why such
awareness is so important to the legal practice—a public service
profession that deals with the manifestations of human behavior on a
day-to-day basis. 34
Critical race, gender, and legal theorists have, for some time now,
advocated a subjective understanding of human behavior based on
the subjectivity of knowledge grounded in one’s individual
experiences. 35 However, how do such subjective processes affect
one’s thinking and decision-making? 36 An understanding of our
cognitive processes is vital to assessing what we think we know.
Legal theorist, Steven L. Winter, who has written a book assessing
the implications of cognitive science for law and legal theory,
explains that cognitive science shows the mind is neither a computer,
processing input gathered from the senses, nor a cultural concept, at
the mercy of our own “creativity.” 37 Rather, studies show that the
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.

37.

SULLIVAN ET AL., supra note 30, at 171–73.
BEST PRACTICES FOR LEGAL EDUCATION, supra note 10, at 256–58.
See infra Part III.
See infra Part III.
See STEVEN L. WINTER, A CLEARING IN THE FOREST: LAW, LIFE, AND MIND, at xiii
(2001).
For example, author Elizabeth Wilson focuses specifically on the field of feminist
psychology and discusses the implications of a failure to acknowledge advancements
in neuroscience on feminist psychology. See ELIZABETH A. WILSON, NEURAL
GEOGRAPHIES: FEMINISM AND THE MICROSTRUCTURE OF COGNITION (1998). Wilson
argues that the exclusion of the body from the concept of gender, which she states has
become indispensible to feminist psychology’s critical practice, will prevent the
discipline’s advancement. See id. at 49–52. Wilson states, “[A]n antibiological
gender will too readily reduce an analysis of mental processes, functions, and states to
the exclusion or trivialization of neurology.” Id. at 51.
WINTER, supra note 35, at xi–xii. Professor Winter is the Walter S. Gibbs Professor
of Constitutional Law and director of the Center for Legal Studies at Wayne State
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mind is formed by our interactions with the physical and social
world. This is a dynamic and imaginative process that is the
foundation of “human thought and rationality.” 38 However, this
imaginative process operates in a systematic and orderly way, so, as
Winters asserts, a capable model of human knowledge can exist. 39
Neuroscience is moving towards an objective understanding of the
influence of subjective factors, such as internal and external stimuli
and cultural systems, on human thinking. By understanding our
cognitive structures and their impact on our reasoning, we can
understand our own judgment better and improve decision-making.
Human behavior is a characteristically complex system. 40 As Erica
Beecher-Monas and Dr. Edgar Garcia-Rill explain, “Complexity
theory explains that we, as individuals, are interacting parts of a
complex world, we have numerous interactions with our
environment, and the instigator of our actions, the brain itself, is a
complex organ.” 41
Therefore, complexity theory shows the
importance of measuring all relevant information in order to make
Today, relevant information in
more accurate judgments. 42
criticizing and restructuring our understanding of human behavior
includes neuroscientific research and findings. Perhaps, once we can
understand how complex the origins of human behavior are, we will
better be able to prevent certain factors from negatively influencing
other factors.

38.
39.
40.
41.

42.

University Law School. He teaches a variety of seminars on topics in legal theory that
have included Ethics of the Lawyering Experience; Cognitive Science and Law; Law
and Linguistics; and Racism, Cognitive Theory, and the Law. He is also the author of
various articles on constitutional law and legal theory, including The Metaphor of
Standing and the Problem of Self-Governance; An Upside/Down View of the
Countermajoritarian Difficulty; The “Power” Thing; Melville, Slavery, and the
Failure of the Judicial Process, What Makes Modernity Late?; and Reimagining
Democracy for Social Individuals. Faculty Profiles, WAYNE ST. U. L. SCH.,
http://www.law.wayne.edu/faculty/bio.php?id=43027 (last visited May. 12, 2011).
WINTER, supra note 35, at xii.
Id. at xi–xii.
Erica Beecher-Monas & Edgar Garcia-Rill, Danger at the Edge of Chaos: Predicting
Violent Behavior in a Post-Daubert World, 24 CARDOZO L. REV. 1845, 1885 (2003).
Id.; see also WILSON, supra note 36, at 51–52 (explaining that by assuming gender to
be inscribed upon an unchangeable biology (sex), the body is excluded “from
questions of culturation that the notion of gender alone is thought to entail”). Wilson
advocates that the relation of any biological space, structure, or element to its outside
(thus the nature of biology itself) is figured as one of considerable complexity. Id. at
54.
Beecher-Monas & Garcia-Rill, supra note 40, at 1886.
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The multidisciplinary study of brain science 43 reveals that the
brain’s mental functions are extremely interactive and dynamic.
Neuroplasticity44 is now an established theory that the brain is highly
adaptive and that some brain functions are transferable to different
brain regions. Neuroplasticity also refers to learning capacity that is
more extensive than previously thought. In fact, studies suggest that
learning is a process that an individual can effectively utilize despite
significant lapses and issues of aging. 45 For example, comprehension
of specific material can be consolidated even though the study
activity has lapsed for several years or has been interrupted due to
traumatic brain injury. 46 Thus, actual learning occurs in “fits and
starts” 47 from one moment to the next. Often the learning proceeds in
a backward momentum, which is similar to the way memory is
reconstructed. In other words, learning is a “groping” process. 48

43.
44.

45.

46.

47.

48.

See supra note 4.
“Neuroplasticity” broadly includes changes that can occur both during learning and
aging; the adult brain has enormous adaptive capacity, or neuroplasticity. See
NORMAN DOIDGE, THE BRAIN THAT CHANGES ITSELF: STORIES OF PERSONAL TRIUMPH
FROM THE FRONTIERS OF BRAIN SCIENCE, at xv (2007).
See John Dunlosky & Christopher Hertzog, Training Programs to Improve Learning
in Later Adulthood: Helping Older Adults Educate Themselves, in METACOGNITION IN
EDUCATIONAL THEORY AND PRACTICE 249, 254–59 (Douglas J. Hacker et al. eds.,
1998) (discussing techniques for continued self-regulated learning for aging
individuals based upon understanding of brain function).
Interruptions to engage in play activities during learning sessions can improve the
capacity to learn and remember. See, e.g., STUART BROWN & CHRISTOPHER
VAUGHAN, PLAY: HOW IT SHAPES THE BRAIN, OPENS THE IMAGINATION, AND
INVIGORATES THE SOUL 99–102 (2009). Learning is enhanced by interspersing
aerobic activity. See JOHN MEDINA, BRAIN RULES: 12 PRINCIPLES FOR SURVIVING AND
THRIVING AT WORK, HOME, AND SCHOOL 24–25 (2008).
“Fits and starts” is frequently used to refer to movement that occurs at irregular
intervals. Although a tautology (because both fit and start refer to sporadic activity),
the phrase is more than 300 years old, appearing, for example, in 1620. See ROBERT
SANDERSON, D.D., Ad Populum: Sermon 1, in 3 THE WORKS OF ROBERT SANDERSON,
D.D. 3, 18–19 (William Jacobson, D.D., ed., 1854), available at
http://www.archive.org/details/worksrobertsand03sanduoft (“[I]f thou hast these
things only by fits and starts.”).
Learning has been described as occurring by a series of fits and starts, or “groping.”
See, e.g., PAUL FREEDMAN, THE PRINCIPLES OF SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH 98 (1949),
available at http://www.archive.org/details/principlesofscie029339mbp (describing
the most difficult scientific learning as “groping through a maze of possibilities and
difficulties”).

DO NOT DELETE

618

6/5/2011 3:38 PM

Baltimore Law Review

[Vol. 40

II. WE DO NOT KNOW WHAT WE THINK WE KNOW
I identify five specific theories about brain function or human
behavior, each of which affects the quality of legal problem-solving.
The impact of each theory detracts from the intended accuracy of the
lawyer’s perception and interpretation of data. I give separate
treatment to each theory, although they likely overlap in actual
function. It is not my intention to provide an overarching scientific
framework of the interrelationship of these separate points. I leave
the development of that global framework to the scientists within
those disciplines. The reader should also note that I do not intend any
hierarchical order to these theories other than I start with a foundation
theory and then move through perception processes, then
interpretation methods, and then conclude with memory.
A. We Automatically Think We Know More Than We Actually Do:
We Assume Unconsciously That We Understand More About
Everything
Neuroscience confirms the presence of an automatic unconscious
assumption by the human brain that the individual thinks she or he
knows more than the individual actually does. 49 The human brain
routinely overestimates how much understanding we have about any
experience or circumstance. For example, one study documents an
“illusion of exploratory depth,” which illustrates that people think
they understand how and why things occur in “far greater detail” than
they actually do. 50
When tested, their understandings are
significantly incomplete regarding the dynamics of the systems
involved. 51 Each individual incorrectly believes that they accurately
perceive, understand, and imagine future experience. 52 As I describe
below, brain functioning often causes significant distortions to what
49.

50.
51.
52.

See Leonid Rozenblit & Frank Keil, The Misunderstood Limits of Folk Science: An
Illusion of Explanatory Depth, 26 COGNITIVE SCI. 521 (2002) (consisting of several
studies demonstrating that the individual tends to think they know more than they
actually do); Frank C. Keil, Folkscience: Coarse Interpretations of a Complex Reality,
7 TRENDS COGNITIVE SCI. 368, 369 fig.1 (2003) (discussing the assumption that the
individuals believe they understand the world in far more detail than they actually do).
Rozenblit & Keil, supra note 49, at 522.
Id. at 526–29; see also Keil, supra note 49, at 368.
Daniel Gilbert devotes an entire book to debunking this distortion in human
processing by explaining the compelling scientific theory and quantitative studies.
See generally DANIEL GILBERT, STUMBLING ON HAPPINESS (2005); see also Jeremy A.
Blumenthal, Law and the Emotions: The Problems of Affective Forecasting, 80 IND.
L.J. 155, 173–77 (2005) (supporting Gilbert’s theory by arguing that individuals
overpredict their level of unpleasant reactions to future negative situations).
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an individual perceives and remembers. Yet the brain does not
recognize these distortions, and the result is that we routinely
overestimate what we know. 53 The initial platform of inaccurate
perception and faulty inferences form the backdrop to the beginning
of the lawyer’s deliberate fact investigation and any reasoning based
thereon. The organic propensity to assume greater knowledge, at
least partially, explains why we are often surprised by what we do not
know about a specific aspect in a given legal case. 54 By integrating
some knowledge about brain science, law students are encouraged to
question their own inferential processes and intentionally expand
their data gathering. 55 This knowledge allows lawyers to be less
defensive about what they do not know or what they may have
misunderstood. The result is increased openness to further exploring
the facts and a different approach to problem solving.
If law students understand that what they “know” may not be
accurate and, as a result, develop skepticism about what they know,
they will be more open to learning the tools to avoid both their novice
assumptions that certain facts exist 56 and “automatic” jumps to
inappropriate conclusions on the basis of inadequate fact
development. 57 When students are taught that our brains reassure us
that we know more than we do rather than the truth, that our brains
trick us and fail to alert us to distortions, they will see the value in
learning these tools.

53.
54.
55.

56.
57.

See Rozenblit & Keil, supra note 49, at 522.
See id. at 530–31; Keil, supra note 49, at 368.
As Rozenblit and Keil have demonstrated, laypersons are often unaware of their lack
of or incompleteness of knowledge and, generally, have little reason to doubt their
intuitions. By being aware of this common fault, lawyers can take proactive steps to
avoid this. See Rozenblit & Keil, supra note 49, at 522.
See generally Keil, supra note 49 (supporting the notion that people tend to think they
know or understand more than they actually do).
See Avishalom Tor, The Methodology of the Behavioral Analysis of Law, 4 HAIFA L.
REV. 237, 294–95 (2008). I commonly encounter law students in my Evidence
courses that make the faulty assumption that all individuals perceive and process facts
in the same way. This orientation stands in stark contrast to my instruction that all
perception is based on drawing inferences from external data. Teaching students
about the inferential reasoning process is an essential basis for understanding the law
of relevance and the necessary fact investigation skills for taking into account
individual differences in perception.
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B. What We Believe to Be Objectively True Is Not Necessarily So:
Belief Is Simply a Point of View.
Belief is simply a point of view and is not inherently accurate or
inaccurate, objectively true or false, or right or wrong. However, the
individual—including the legal practitioner—usually operates with
unquestioned reliance on their beliefs as objectively accurate. 58 We
construct our own point of view as a byproduct of our everyday
perception of the world and “indeed, it is how we have a world.” 59
We operate under the mistaken belief that our perceptions reflect
objective reality because we are, more often than not, successful in
correlating our perceptions to reality. 60
Several studies indicate how beliefs shape assessments and create
distortions that may influence a lawyer’s capacity to predict
accurately. 61 Preferences influence the formation of an individual’s
belief. 62 Fragale and Heath, among other scholars, stand apart for
their clarity in showing the human propensity to confabulate belief
with fact. 63 Their findings show that individuals automatically
default to using their specific belief as the accurate measure used in
the self-educating techniques of trial and error methods in any
problem-solving process. 64 This approach is commonly referred to as
“heuristics.” 65 Perceived reality is based upon individual biases and
those biases are a product of experience combined with the
individual’s fundamental beliefs. 66 This means that individuals
“invest ambiguous information with the meaning” that most favors

58.

59.
60.

61.
62.
63.
64.
65.

66.

See Alison R. Fragale & Chip Heath, Evolving Informational Credentials: The
(Mis)Attribution of Believable Facts to Credible Sources, 30 PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. BULL. 225, 226–27 (2004); see also Tor, supra note 57, at 255.
WINTER, supra note 35, at 33.
Id. As a professor of Evidence Law for more than twenty years and a practicing law
professor for even longer, I observe that law students conflate their inferences with
what they assume to be verifiable external data. Rather, the separation of inference
from external fact happens only as a product of explicitly identifying the students’
inferences repeatedly.
See Fragale & Heath, supra note 58, at 225; Tor, supra note 57, at 256.
Tor, supra note 57, at 254.
See Fragale & Heath, supra note 58, at 226–27.
Id. at 233.
Heuristic – Definition and More from the Free Merriam–Webster Dictionary,
MERRIAM–WEBSTER, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/heuristic (last
visited May 12, 2011) (defining Heuristics as “involving or serving as an aid to
learning, discovery, or problem-solving by experimental and especially trial-and-error
methods; also: of or relating to exploratory problem-solving techniques that utilize
self-educating techniques (as the evaluation of feedback) to improve performance”).
See Tor, supra note 57, at 253–55.
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their individual self-interest. 67 Individuals readily conflate what is
belief with what is actual fact, because if we did not do so we would
not be able to function in the most mundane of daily tasks. 68 A
problematic consequence of this default functioning of conflating
belief with fact is that we “align [our] expectations” of outcomes in
problem solving “with [our] preferences about [those] outcomes.” 69
For example, Fragale and Heath concretely demonstrate how we
use belief as an oversimplified heuristic that leads to inaccurate
perception. 70 Specifically, they demonstrate how readily individuals
credit their beliefs to credible sources. And the more the individual
believes their proposition to be true, the more likely the individual
will be to credit their belief to “high-credibility sources.” 71 This
heuristic comes from the “well-developed association between
credible sources and truthful information.” 72 Fragale and Heath
demonstrate how individuals rely on the “well-learned cognitive
shortcut” of the “simple-decision rule” that expert knowledge is
reliable when spontaneously judging the accuracy of the data. 73 In
any given circumstance, the objective accuracy may often not
correlate with the spontaneous judgment. 74 Fragale and Heath
confirm that individuals confuse their subjective belief in the truth of
a statement with the objective truth of the statement. 75
We do not routinely include in our perception the consideration that
our belief forms the basis for our determination of what is true. Yet,
belief inevitably colors judgment even when there is the expectation
that judgment should be independent of belief. 76 This understanding
does not deny the existence of a “reality” or actual facts; Instead, it
reinforces the objective truth that there are multiple interpretations of
the actual facts. What one “sees” is heavily dependent on that
individual’s previous contextual history of what their visual

67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.

Id. at 255. One may argue, therefore, that one’s learning capacity is profoundly
influenced by one’s biases. See id.
See id. at 256–57.
Id. at 256.
Fragale & Heath, supra note 58, at 225, 227–33 (discussing three scientific studies
that demonstrate how individuals attribute their beliefs to credible sources).
Id. at 226–27.
Id. at 226.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 226–27.
See WINTER, supra note 35, at 33.
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experiences have taught them to see. 77 We interpret what we actually
see within our established framework of previous understandings. 78
This concept is also clarified by the term “predictably irrational” as
used in the explanation that economic choices are often made before
conscious thought, which rationalizes the choices. 79
Other studies also illustrate how one’s beliefs regularly distort his
or her predictions by, for example, overestimating personal abilities
and overpredicting the likelihood of successful outcomes. 80 As a
consequence, lawyers may not anticipate degrees of risk nor plan a
course of action appropriately. 81 Psychological research confirms
that individuals are unable “to accurately predict future emotional
states” of themselves or others, particularly in terms of intensity and
duration. 82 Rather, the research demonstrates that individuals are
hard-wired to overestimate the degree of future emotional states. 83
Furthermore, research studies show that individuals will more
strongly react to negative content than to pleasurable content. 84 This
natural tendency leads to overestimating future negative experience
and undervaluing future neutral or positive experience. 85 Thus, brain
science has begun to provide us with tools to understand the
operation of the mental functions we use in carrying out lawyering
tasks, whether conscious or not. 86 Applying our understandings from
brain science may increase the law student’s receptivity to becoming

77.

78.
79.
80.

81.
82.
83.
84.
85.

86.

Id. at 34 (discussing Jerome S. Bruner & Leo Postman, On the Perception of
Incongruity: A Paradigm, 18 J. PERSONALITY 206 (1949); quoting THOMAS KUHN,
THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS 113 (2d ed. 1970)).
Id. at 34–36.
DAN ARIELY, PREDICTABLY IRRATIONAL: THE HIDDEN FORCES THAT SHAPE OUR
DECISIONS, at XXX, 243 (1st rev. & expanded ed. 2009).
Tor, supra note 57, at 254 (citing Shelley E. Taylor & Jonathon Brown, Illusion and
Well-Being: A Social Psychological Perspective on Mental Health, 103 PSYCHOL.
BULL. 193, 195 (1988); Shelley E. Taylor & Jonathon Brown, Positive Illusions and
Well-Being Revisited: Separating Fact from Fiction, 116 PSYCHOL. BULL. 21, 22
(1994); Neil D. Weinstein, Unrealistic Optimism About Future Life Events, 39 J.
PERSONALITY AND SOC. PSYCHOL. 806, 806 (1980)).
See id. at 245–55 (stating that people generally underestimate risks and fail to take
appropriate action).
Blumenthal, supra note 52, at 155, 167.
Id. at 166–67 (citing Philip Brickman et al., Lottery Winner and Accident Victims: Is
Happiness Relative?, 36 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 917, 926 (1978)).
See id. at 176.
See id. at 175–76 (citing Daniel T. Gilbert et al., Immune Neglect: A Source of
Durability Bias in Affective Forecasting, 75 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 617,
618–20, 636 (1998)).
See WINTER, supra note 35, at 2–3.
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more self-aware in the execution of legal tasks and therefore more
able to exercise better clinical judgment.
Decision-making is a prerequisite to conscious action. However,
studies indicate that individuals take actions milliseconds before
becoming conscious of making the decision to act. 87 Brain research
suggests that our actions are initiated by unconscious mental
processes before we become aware of our intention to act. 88 We can
thus reasonably infer that the default human inclination is to
overestimate the degree of conscious choice in dictating action before
awareness. 89
Judge Morris B. Hoffman acknowledges that
neuroscience is producing evidence that decisions are products of
complex brain function and therefore there remains little utility to
think of behavior as simply habitual, mindless, or unthinking. 90
There exists extensive knowledge and applied theory on the range
of complex brain functions also known as “executive functions.” 91
Executive function refers to the large set of metacognitive processes
in the brain that, among other abilities, help us plan, incorporate past
knowledge, track time, simultaneously pay attention to multiple
things, reflect, redirect and modify our choices, and supplement our
fact gathering. 92 Nor is there utility in holding onto the inaccurate
belief that all our behavioral choices are conscious or entirely a
product of free will. We may function with the belief that we are
driven almost entirely by free will but that belief is seriously

87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.

Benjamin Libet, Unconscious Cerebral Initiative and the Role of Conscious Will in
Voluntary Action, 8 BEHAV. BRAIN SCI. 529, 533 tbl.1 (1985).
Chun Siong Soon et al., Unconscious Determinants of Free Decisions in the Human
Brain, 11 NATURE NEUROSCIENCE 543, 543 (2008); Id. at 536.
See Soon et al., supra note 88, at 543.
See Morris B. Hoffman, The Neuroeconomic Path of the Law, 359 PHIL.
TRANSACTIONS ROYAL SOC’Y BIOLOGICAL SCI. 1667, 1671 (2004).
See RICHARD E. NISBETT, INTELLIGENCE AND HOW TO GET IT: WHY SCHOOLS AND
CULTURE COUNT 49–51 (2009).
See id. at 7; see also Sheldon H. Horowitz, Executive Functioning and Learning
Disabilities, NAT’L CTR. FOR LEARNING DISABILITIES (Mar. 1, 2007),
http://www.ncld.org/ld-basics/ld-aamp-executive-functioning/basic-ef-facts/executive
-functioning-and-learning-disabilities. In my article To Be of Service, I identified
several mental processes associated with both the intuitive skills as well as the range
of executive functions, which I articulated in a framework of interconnecting both the
Perceptive Self and the Knowing Self. See Beryl Blaustone, To Be of Service: The
Lawyer’s Aware Use of the Human Skills Associated with the Perceptive Self, 15 J.
LEGAL PROF. 241, 264–68 (1990).
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questioned by many researchers and scholars. 93 As a result, Judge
Hoffman argues for revisiting our understanding of how judges,
jurors, and legislators make decisions. 94
In fact, there are many scholarly experiments that repeatedly
document the basic human behavior to collect information that
validates one’s pre-existing prejudices and biases. 95 Any human
being will more likely gravitate towards the information, which
corroborates one’s pre-existing point of view and subconsciously
dismiss data that undermines one’s point of view. 96 Some research
studies document the effects of group identity in creating a double
moral standard of fairness. 97 However, studies also demonstrate that
individuals are able to fall back upon their intuitive sense of fairness
if they are preoccupied with other mental functions, which disallow
the ability to rationalize one’s actions. 98 Given all the validation that
belief influences what we determine to be objective truth, 99 we should
embed a deliberate practice that promotes doubt and encourages us to
disconnect or create separation for ourselves from our impulses in
formulating a point of view.
Most of our beliefs go untested. Some studies have shown a strong
correlation between whether we believe a statement to be true with
our judgment of the credibility of the source. 100 For instance, a rumor
or false statement of fact is often taken as true if attributed to a
reputable source. 101 The predilection to gravitate toward confirming
evidence of our beliefs adversely affects the quality of our data
93.

See Joshua Greene & Jonathan Cohen, For the Law, Neuroscience Changes Nothing
and Everything, 359 PHIL. TRANSACTIONS ROYAL SOC’Y BIOLOGICAL SCI. 1775, 1781
(2004).
94. Hoffman, supra note 90, at 1673.
95. See, e.g., Thierry Devos & Mahzarin R. Banaji, American = White?, 88 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 447, 447–48 (2005).
96. Jessica Winet et al., Do We See Barack Obama and John McCain as Equally
American? It Depends on Your Lenses!, poster presented at the 89th Annual
Convention of the W. Psychological Ass’n, Portland, Or. (Apr. 22, 2009); see also
Nicholas D. Kristof, Op-Ed., What? Me Biased?, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 30, 2008, at A39,
available
at
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/10/30/opinion/30kristof.html?_r=1
(discussing Devo’s studies of race in the 2008 presidential election).
97. Piercarlo Valdesolo & David DeSteno, The Duality of Virtue: Deconstructing the
Moral Hypocrite, 44 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 1334, 1334-37 (2008); see also
John Tierney, Deep Down, We Can’t Fool Even Ourselves, N.Y. TIMES, July 1, 2008,
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/07/01/science/01tier.html (discussing computer task
studies relating to moral hypocrisy).
98. Valdesolo & DeSteno, supra note 97, at 1336–37.
99. Fragale & Heath, supra note 58, at 226–27.
100. Id. at 229 (results from Study 1).
101. Id. at 225–26.
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gathering processes in the full range of tasks in legal problemsolving. 102 For example, a lawyer who searches for confirming
evidence and ignores conflicting evidence will develop an inadequate
theory of the case for trial or present the client with problem-solving
options that limit rather than expand the client’s options. 103 By
teaching the Intentionality framework, teachers aid law students in
developing an internal monitor essential for self-regulated learning in
professional practice.
C. The Objects We Perceive Are Not Necessarily As They Appear to
Be: Perceptual Blind Spots Exist in All Cognitive Functions
Perceptual blind spots are part of all cognitive function, and
therefore looking is never the same as seeing. Perception is quite
porous yet our default behavior is to assume that our looking is the
same as accurately seeing the objective external world. Reality and
memory are “constructs” of the brain rather than truly “mirror[ed]”
images. 104 We most often experience perceptions as “‘corresponding’
to an objective reality.” 105 The successful correlation of our day-today interactions with the external world creates the misimpression
that our beliefs correspond to objective reality. 106 As lawyers, we
assume that we can easily assess the distortion of perception by
client, witness, and fact-finder. We may not, however, question the
impact of our own organic level of perceptual distortion. What we
absorb visually is full of perceptual holes, but our brains fill in the
rest of the picture very well; 107 however, this does not mean our
filling in is highly accurate. 108
What matters is how we focus our attention on what we see. We
are creatively filling in from previous moments and previous
experiences to a much more extensive degree than we commonly
acknowledge. 109 We do not notice the gaps unless something appears
to be out of place. For instance, the individual may paint in the
existence of a stop sign rather than a yield sign at the scene of an

102. Id. at 226–27.
103. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.1 cmt. (2009) (stating that competent
representation requires adequate preparation and evaluation of the evidence).
104. WINTER, supra note 35, at 33.
105. Id.
106. See id.
107. See id. at 34 (citing KUHN, supra note 77, at 113).
108. See id. at 35–36.
109. See id.
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accident 110—this is why some studies observe participants watching
magic tricks. 111
Magic tricks show us that what matters in seeing is the point of
attention. 112 What holds our attention may not be what is objectively
true or decisive. Magicians intentionally misdirect and thus distort
the observer’s perception by controlling the social cues. The brain
function of perceiving fact is not predominately driven by visuomotor
control. 113 In other words, the process of perception is more “than
what meets the eye.” 114 In fact, most participants who watched a
disappearing ball trick were convinced that they saw a ball in the air
that never left the hand of the magician. 115 Events may occur in full
view and yet be unnoticed by the observer. Studies of both “change
blindness,” which happens by interrupting the viewing, and
“inattentional blindness,” in which the observer’s focus on specific
tasks causes the failure to detect fact, demonstrate how difficult it is
to register what should be perceived. 116 We create information out of
what we see, and we fill in assumed information with the received
information in order to make sense out of any circumstance. 117 We
are too comfortable with our subjective perceptual experience, which
allows us to believe that our brain’s perceptual processing of all our
day-to-day events corresponds to an accurate objective reality.
“Presentism” is “[t]he tendency for current experience to influence
one’s views of the past and the future.” 118 Predictable error occurs
because the individual is operating with the unconscious assumption
that the future will be like the present. 119 “[O]nly a small portion of
[the] sensory information [from our eyes, ears, and skin] ever arrives

110. See infra text accompanying notes 152–53.
111. See Benjamin W. Tatler & Gustav Kuhn, Don’t Look Now: The Magic of
Misdirection, in EYE MOVEMENTS: A WINDOW ON MIND AND BRAIN 697 (Roger P.G.
van Gompel et al. eds., 2007); Gustav Kuhn & Michael F. Land, There’s More to
Magic Than Meets the Eye, 16 CURRENT BIOLOGY, at R950 (2006); Gustav Kuhn &
Benjamin W. Tatler, Magic and Fixation: Now You Don’t See It, Now You Do, 34
PERCEPTION 1155 (2005); Gustav Kuhn et al., Misdirection in Magic: Implications for
the Relationship Between Eye Gaze and Attention, 16 VISUAL COGNITION 391 (2008).
112. Kuhn & Tatler, supra note 111, at 1156.
113. Kuhn & Land, supra note 111, at R950.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Kuhn et al., supra note 111, at 391–92; Tatler & Kuhn, supra note 111, at 699.
117. See WINTER, supra note 35, at 95–97 (discussing a research experiment with Linda, a
feminist bank teller).
118. GILBERT, supra note 52, at 121.
119. See id. at 126–27.
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in our conscious awareness.” 120 We recognize these misimpressions
only when something goes wrong and we become more aware of
perceptual defects. 121 In other words, we more readily notice
something when it is “wrong” or out of place, meaning that we often
form perception based on expectation. 122 When we do not notice the
distortion, we operate as though it does not exist. However, some
level of distortion does exist; it simply may not appear to be so out of
place that it is worth our noticing. 123 The problem is that the
distortion may be significant even though we are unaware of its
presence. Perception by its very nature means that we never see the
same image twice. 124 Studies also show that we make value
judgments instantaneously about other individuals based upon less
than conscious reactions to facial expression. 125
The antidote to perceptual blindness is to incorporate the
Intentionality framework in which we consciously assume that all
perception contains defects and thus routinely remain open to
subjecting our observations to further scrutiny.
D. Accurate Recall Is a Falsehood
Human beings assume that their memory is more accurate than it is.
In order to make sense of what is recalled, each person must fill in
information beyond what the person actually physically stores in his
or her brain. The “sheer mass” of all the sensory data that is sifted
during daily activity would immobilize the individual’s cognitive
resources if the brain had to recall all the information consciously. 126
In other words, humans fill in gaps with assumed information in
order to make sense of any external circumstance. 127 Law students,
however, are not adequately challenged in their view of the accuracy
of their own recall and are minimally exposed to the inaccuracies of
120. Daniel T. Smith, Research, DURHAM UNIV., http://www.dur.ac.uk/daniel.smith2/
Research%20Interests.htm (last visited May 12, 2011).
121. WINTER, supra note 35, at 33.
122. See id.
123. See id. at 33–34.
124. See H. Sebastian Seung & Daniel D. Lee, The Manifold Ways of Perception, 290 SCI.
2268, 2268 (2000) (stating that people “never see the same face twice” because “facial
images . . . vary from moment to moment . . . [and] sensory inputs are in flux”).
125. See, e.g., Alexander Todorov et al., Evaluating Faces on Trustworthiness After
Minimal Time Exposure, 27 SOC. COGNITION 813, 813–19 (2009) (concluding that in
less than 100 milliseconds people can make accurate trustworthiness judgments based
on nothing more than facial expressions).
126. WINTER, supra note 35, at 96–97.
127. See id. at 95.
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their clients’ and witnesses’ recall. 128 Although there is some
imperative to understand credibility issues, law instructors do not
emphasize that replaying of memory is inherently inaccurate, even
after being tested for credibility defects. 129 Law students do not
understand that memory is a process of filling in what is not recalled
and for leaving out recalled data that does not help to recreate the
memory. Source amnesia is one such routine example of the porous
character of actual memory. 130 As fact imprints move from
hippocampus to cortex, the fact imprint is separated from the context
in which it was perceived—for instance, not recalling how one
learned a basic fact like the name of a street. 131 Complete experience
is not stored but “a few critical threads” are, and the recollection
gives the illusion that full memory was stored and retrieved. 132
Source amnesia partially explains why a person may not be able to
discern the truth of statements of fact. 133 Moreover, the passage of
time and attributing the information source as highly credible will
influence how the information is remembered. 134 This influence may
lead to remembering what did not happen with a great deal of detail
that is consistent with the credible source. 135 Misattribution occurs
when information is recalled that did not happen, or is attributed
incorrectly to a time and place, or actually did happen but the mind
attributes the recall to imagination. 136 “Suggestibility” is the
tendency to incorporate misleading information from external sources
128. Professor Berger’s identification experiment in evidence class. Professor Vivian
Berger, renowned evidence law professor and legal scholar (recently deceased),
conducted studies among her law students at Brooklyn Law School to demonstrate for
them that their inaccurate recall of external facts was substantial and that their
conviction of belief reinforced those inaccuracies. The Eyewitness Identification
Laboratory in the Psychology Department at the University of Iowa has done
extensive scientific studies establishing the inaccuracies of eyewitness testimony and
has been influential in the reform of witness identification procedures.
129. This observation is the author’s point of view stemming from my experience in
teaching evidence and lawyering skills for twenty-eight years and from my live-case
clinical supervision of law students for fourteen years.
130. See Fragale & Heath, supra note 58, at 226.
131. See Pablo Alvarez & Larry R. Squire, Memory Consolidation and the Medial
Temporal Lobe: A Simple Network Model, 91 PROCEEDINGS NAT’L ACAD. SCI. U.S.
7041, 7042 (1994).
132. GILBERT, supra note 52, at 87.
133. Fragale & Heath, supra note 58, at 226–27.
134. See id.
135. See id. at 226–27, 234.
136. See id. at 234; Daniel Schacter et al., The Seven Sins of Memory: Implications for Self,
1001 ANNALS N.Y. ACAD. SCI. 226, 228 (2003), available at http://www.wjh.
harvard.edu/~scanlab/papers/2003_Schacter_SevenSinsSelf.pdf.
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into personal recollections and can be caused by overt suggestion. 137
Both misattribution and suggestibility can easily occur in the
lawyering context of interviewing witnesses and clients. It is
important for lawyers to recognize that a memory is not a static
recollection of an event. It is constantly being influenced in the
process of recall and in the interactions between the lawyer and the
person who is engaged in recollection. It is important that the lawyer
does not try to edit the person’s recollection by dismissing seemingly
irrelevant material, which could be crucial in cueing material that is
relevant to the case, or interrupting the witness’s cognitive narrative
with overt suggestions that might encourage the client or witness to
please the interviewer. There is a delicate balance between listening,
guiding, and probing that must be maintained so the client’s
recollection process occurs as unaffected by the lawyer as possible.
Even then, the lawyer must maintain an awareness of the process of
memory recall and its default operations. If something does not seem
right, the lawyer can probe the witness while trying as much as
possible to not contribute to either suggestibility or misattribution in
the client’s memory recall.
All this is to say that it is quite possible in any situation for an
individual, including a lawyer, to remember a “statement” as true
when originally it was false. Practicing Intentionality and paying
attention to why sources feel familiar, paying attention to external
expectations about recall, identifying suggestive questions, and not
making snap judgments will reduce the effects of both misattribution
and suggestibility. 138
Also, “information acquired after an event alters memory of the
event.” 139 The information is not actually part of the event because it
is inserted afterwards. Ordinarily, people cannot tell when they are
both filling in gaps or leaving data out and creating gaps because it
happens unconsciously and quickly. 140 The human brain is supplying
best guesses without asking permission. 141 Our current experience
influences our recreation of the past and influences our view of the
future, 142 though we do fill in with a degree of accuracy. 143
137. See Schacter et al., supra note 136, at 228–29.
138. See DANIEL L. SCHACTER, THE SEVEN SINS OF MEMORY: HOW THE MIND FORGETS AND
REMEMBERS 8–9, 111, 137 (2001); infra Part III.
139. See GILBERT, supra note 52, at 88.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 90.
142. See id. at 125–27.
143. See id. at 89.
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“Memory . . . is a dynamic property of populations of neurons; the
basic mechanism is synaptic change, but memory occurs as a system
property.” 144 Individual sensory maps become memory. 145 The
individual is unconsciously inclined to recall what one thought, did,
or said by substituting what the individual now thinks, does, or
says. 146
Memory is thus a recreating process, fabrication woven among
essential threads of bits of accurate recall. 147 Suggestibility continues
to influence memory even when the person remembering understands
this concept and is told that the exercise is a trick. 148 For instance in
one study, the readers are instructed that after reading a list they will
give the wrong answer as to what word was left out of the list. 149 The
list has terms in the categories of rest, fatigue, bedding, and
dreaming. The reader will quickly identify that the word “gasoline”
was not among the terms read. 150 However, the reader will also
misremember the word “sleep” as listed among the terms when, in
fact, it was absent. Here, memory is actually incorrectly filling in
details not stored. 151
In another study, individuals watched a series of slides in which a
car slows down at a yield sign and then turns the corner and hits a
pedestrian. 152 Some participants were then prompted to recall what
happened when the car stopped at the stop sign. Then, those
participants were shown two slides: one with the car at a stop sign
and one with the car at a yield sign. Ninety percent of the responders
indicated that the slide with the stop sign was what they originally
saw. 153 Thus, memory is extremely susceptible to subsequent
distortion. This observation emphasizes that this distortion is greater
than commonly acknowledged by lawyers.
In a meeting among a clinical legal supervisor, a legal intern, and a
client, the legal intern made a statement about an important aspect of
the case that the legal intern remembered the client having said. The
client responded that she had never said such a thing and that she

144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.

WINTER, supra note 35, at 28.
Id. at 29–31.
GILBERT, supra note 52, at 125–26.
Id. at 87.
Id. at 88–90.
Id. at 88.
Id. at 88–89.
Id. at 89.
Id. at 87.
Id. at 87–88.
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would never make such a representation. 154 In the subsequent
debriefing of the meeting, the supervisor discussed her surprise and
also questioned whether she had also “filled in” that gap because she
said that this may be due to how her memory operates. The legal
intern responded with relief and said “Aha, maybe I filled that in
too!” The supervisor reports that a powerful discussion followed
about the necessity for self-monitoring in the filling in of the gaps in
our recall. The key point for the supervisor was that she rarely had
such an explicit discussion about this issue in supervision meetings
and that she thought these discussions are extremely valuable. This
illustrates the value of practicing some stages of the Intentionality
framework in clinical supervision.
E. The Processes of Reasoning and Decision-Making Do Not Exist
Independent of the Body. 155
Developments in the cognitive sciences over the past two decades
reveal that our cognitive processes, such as the abilities to
conceptualize and to reason, are imaginative processes grounded in
our interactions with our environment, such that “imagination . . . is
the soul of human thinking.” 156 Therefore, in order to understand
such processes we must understand their relationship to the vessel—
our embodiment—in which they occur. 157
All aspects of cognition, such as ideas, thoughts, and concepts, are
dependent on a functioning brain, which operates the human body
while it lives in an environment shaped by physical, cultural, social,
economic, and moral factors. 158 Influenced by all of these factors, the
brain sets up structures for how we experience and how we
understand the world in which we live. Therefore, thought and
reason do not exist independent of the body; rather, the very structure

154. Professor Maria Arias, CUNY School of Law, provided this example when discussing
the content of this article with the author; Muneer I. Ahmad, The Ethics of Narrative,
11 AM. U.J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 117 (2003) (noting that narrative is indicative of
cross-cultural biases).
155. WINTER, supra note 35, at xi–xii. This is a central tenet of Winter’s book, which
discusses the momentous implications of the discovery that human thought is
grounded in our physical and social interactions with the world around us. The
premise underlying this book is straightforward—a better theory of the mind should
contribute to a better understanding of the products of the mind (that is law,
philosophy, etc.). Id.
156. Mark L. Johnson, Mind, Metaphor, Law, 58 MERCER L. REV. 845, 846 (2007).
157. See id.
158. See id.
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of our thoughts comes from the nature of our bodies. 159 This is what
is referred to as “embodied mind,” a term developed by cognitive
linguists and philosophers George Lakoff and Mark L. Johnson. 160
The concept of the “embodied mind” runs counter to the central
Western philosophical notion of “disembodied mind,” which
understands “reason” as a separate phenomenon independent of the
functioning human body. 161 In the legal academy, the perspective of
the disembodied mind construes legal reasoning as the application of
literal and objective categories or principles to a set of facts.
However, cognitive science reveals that reason is not independent of
subjective bodily experiences, such as perception, movement, and
environment. 162 Tapping into such subjective, and often unconscious,
factors has implications on understanding how an individual’s
conceptualization and reasoning processes may be static or,
alternatively, capable of growth.
Empirical evidence within the field of cognitive science reveals
that people build categories around and understand other concepts by
similarity to a prototype. 163 The phenomenon of “prototype effects”
is attributed to the work of the cognitive psychologist Eleanor Rosch
and her colleagues, who illustrated this phenomenon through a bird
study. 164 This study revealed that, in America, robins and sparrows
are generally thought of as being at the center of the category “birds,”
thus establishing cognitive reference points for people’s reasoning
about birds. 165 Participants in the study also put chickens, ostriches,
and penguins into the “bird” category but not at the center of the
category. 166 Rather, depending on the perceived closeness of the item
(chicken, ostrich, or penguin) to the prototype (sparrow or robin), the
perspective of the mind created differing distances from the center of
the category for each item. 167 This distancing effect among items
with different characteristics is caused by “principles of extension.” 168
This is a process of categorization using bodily experience as a

159. GEORGE LAKOFF & MARK L. JOHNSON, PHILOSOPHY IN THE FLESH: THE EMBODIED
MIND AND ITS CHALLENGE TO WESTERN THOUGHT 77 (1999).
160. Id.
161. Id. at 75–77.
162. Id. at 77.
163. See Johnson, supra note 156, at 851 (discussing Eleanor Rosch, Cognitive Reference
Points, 7 COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 532, 532–45 (1975)).
164. See id. (discussing Rosch, supra note 163, at 192, 199, 205).
165. Id. (discussing Rosch, supra note 163, at 201 tbl.1).
166. Id. (discussing Rosch, supra note 163, at 201 tbl.1).
167. Id. (discussing Rosch, supra note 163, at 201 tbl.1).
168. Id. (discussing Rosch, supra note 163, at 532–47).
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directional compass for structuring our cognitive processes. 169 This
categorization process is what establishes patterns, which the mind
uses to reason and create meaning. 170 This meaning is formed from
our bodily experiences interacting with space, time, movement, and
control, all of which are rooted in our sensory-motor systems. 171 The
brain translates bodily experience into abstract thought. This
dynamic and fluid process of creation and expansion of categories
through bodily experience is known as “conceptual metaphor.” 172
Metaphors are motivated by our images and experiences so that
someone who has not previously heard the expression is still able to
infer their meaning by “mapping” their literal meaning onto a more
abstract domain. 173 Consider the metaphors “you are being closed
minded” or “you are very open minded,” which are commonly used
to explain someone’s breadth of view or willingness to engage with
new or different things. These metaphors are grounded in our daily
images of, and experiences with, objects that can be closed and
opened, such as a door. A closed door blocks the ability of someone
to enter while an open door invites entrance or even easy access.
Doors also are generally both opened and closed; therefore, this
metaphor implies an element of control that someone has over their
own willingness or ability to be open minded or closed minded. The
mapping of the literal meanings of “closed” and “open” are mapped
onto the more abstract domain of whether someone is willing to
engage. Consider also Steven Winter’s example of the metaphor,
“the proof of the pudding is in the eating,” which, as Winter explains,
one can reason to its metaphoric meaning even if unfamiliar with the
cliché. 174 By understanding specific facts about puddings—that even
though a pudding has appeared to have gelled on the outside does not
mean it has congealed on the inside, and even though a pudding looks
169.
170.
171.
172.

Id. at 846, 851.
Id. at 851.
See id. at 846.
Id. at 857. Johnson uses the example of a container to show how our bodily
experiences in combination with our cognitive processes allow us to extend embodied
meaning and thought to the highest level of abstraction possible for us, all the way up
to science, philosophy, mathematics, logic, and law. The metaphor “categories are
containers” has its foundation in our experiences with a container in which we learn
the logic of containment (i.e. “interior,” “exterior,” “boundary,” etc.); thus providing
the foundation for concepts like “in” and “out.” “Categories are containers” is created
by mapping the domain of spatial containment onto our understanding of conceptual
categorization. Id. at 857.
173. WINTER, supra note 35, at 50–51.
174. Id.
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good does not mean it will taste good—one can infer the general
suggestion of the metaphor, which is to approach things
pragmatically rather than judging by appearance. 175
Conceptual metaphors are the basic building blocks that enable
communication and are essential to the creation of all meaning. 176
However, the processes of metaphorical inference happen rapidly and
are performed unconsciously. 177 Many of the most basic conceptual
metaphors are developed during childhood by assigning a subjective
thought to a bodily experience. 178 A baby that feels warmth
associates it with affection and the abstract idea of “affection” will
always be associated as being “warm.” 179 We unconsciously recall
these experiences and their metaphorical meanings. This is how we
use the embodied mind to reason and understand abstract thought.
Thus, individuals determine truth based on their particular formation
of metaphor from their physical interactions with the external
world. 180
Learning is a process of the individual brain engaging in making
flexible metaphorical order out of confusion and in external
interaction with social reality. 181 In contrast, legal reasoning
traditionally has imposed an arbitrary, external, and pre-existing
order that is inconsistent with the way an individual learns through
using metaphor. 182 Thus, the evidence that learning occurs by means
of applying flexible use of metaphor is in opposition to the rigid use
of categorization often used in legal analysis, which is understood as
the categorical reason or “rule” for a decision and as being
advantageous for its clarity and predictability. 183 Although legal
reasoning requires flexibility in the process of analogy and
distinction, these processes are often used in order to polarize legal

175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.

Id. at 50.
Id. at 50–51.
Id.
Johnson, supra note 156, at 859.
Id. (citing LAKOFF & JOHNSON, supra note 159, at 48–49).
See id. at 859–61.
See id.
See WINTER, supra note 35, at 187. Legal realism acknowledges that knowledge is
subjective, and, therefore, law is not based on objective laws and principles that can
logically apply, but rather is largely based on one’s own political, social, and moral
views. See id. at 41–42. However, strict-constructionism is still a prevailing view
among many jurists who view law as an external “thing” that operates in a rule-like
fashion. See id. at 206–11.
183. Id. at 43, 57.
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understanding into opposites. 184 Neuroplasticity is the established
theory that the brain has the ability throughout one’s life to
reorganize itself by forming new neural connections and adjusting its
activities to respond to new situations or changes in the
environment. 185 This concept is in opposition to the predominate
lawyering disposition to dismiss the influence of a broad range of
brain dynamics used in conscious manipulation of categories, which
are the building blocks of any reasoning process. 186
My Intentionality framework starts with the assumption of
misunderstanding rather than common understanding. In order to
overcome these differences, and to come to what might be some form
of common understanding, law students or lawyers must first begin
by intentionally examining their own underlying metaphors and
categories that produce their memories. Mark Johnson strips away
the top layer of legal reasoning and exposes the inner working of
legal reasoning by explaining how the brain understands metaphor
and inferences. 187 Veda Collmer, one of my research assistants,
observed the importance of Johnson’s deconstruction of the legal
reasoning process into metaphor and inference as cognitively
significant in her capacity to construct a deliberate metacognitive
framework for monitoring her internal reasoning process. 188 She
wrote:
For instance, while briefing a case, I will determine what
categories are present and what analogies and distinctions
can be drawn from these categories. This awareness of the
184. See Blaustone, supra note 92, at 258–59 (explaining the tendency for lawyers to
analyze matters by dividing issues into dichotomies).
185. See DOIDGE, supra note 44, at 24–26.
186. I have previously theorized several categories of mental functions in competent legal
problem-solving. See Blaustone, supra note 92, at 241. I defined Perceptive Self to
include “skills associated with nonjudgmental listening and expressing; the ability to
monitor internal bias; attending skills for accurate understanding of others; and the
ability to see patterns from analogy and from shifts in examining particularities to
examining generalities.” Id. at 241, 265. My theories of “Perceptive Self” in
lawyering are based in psychological theory. I now argue that reformulating theories
of Perceptive Self to include brain function will ground the law student with more
credible hypotheses of the importance of other mental functions in evaluating data and
performing analytic tasks. I did not focus on the issues of error in recall, perception,
and prediction, which we now know are present even with the conscious integration of
function that I advocated in that piece.
187. See Johnson, supra note 156, at 864–67.
188. Written statement of Veda Collmer, 2008 Graduate of CUNY Sch. of Law (Sept. 21,
2007) (on file with author).
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mechanics of legal reasoning has enhanced my skills . . . . I
used these skills in my judicial writing class, where I wrote
an opinion involving a police car chase and the [F]ourth
[A]mendment. I extended the metaphor for deadly force
used with a gun to deadly force used when ramming a car. I
analogized and distinguished between the two to develop
sound reasoning that would support my holding. My only
experience with guns was that I knew they were deadly.
However, I had experience with vehicles. I drew on my
experiences with cars to analogize to the deadly force posed
by guns. 189
Without intentional reflection, memory is prone to inaccuracy and
error. 190 This is because human inclination relies on the unconscious
assumption of common understanding and, by default, takes it for
granted that there exists a shared foundation of metaphor and
categorization. Practicing my Intentionality framework improves
lawyers’ clinical judgment because consciously examining their
internal thinking on choice of metaphor or category gives lawyers an
opportunity to assess if they have the correct meaning at a specific
choice-point in legal decision making. At a minimum, lawyers will
be less likely to assume common understanding. Law students are
able to deliberately counteract the pitfalls in their memory process.
One of my legal research assistants wrote that knowledge about
human memory has me more reflective and self-aware about
how an individual uses his or her memory to recall events
and construct the past.
An understanding of what
neuroscience has revealed . . . the true nature of memory and
all its “sins” has made me think more about interviewing
clients and witnesses, including the use of this knowledge to
attack eyewitness testimony, mediate a conflict between two
parties who each have completely different versions of the
events that led them to mediation, or assisting a client in
recalling events as accurately as possible.. 191

189. Id.
190. See, e.g., Daniel L. Schacter, Seven Sins of Memory: Insights from Psychology and
Cognitive Science, 54 AM. PSYCHOL. 182, 183 (1999) (describing the many ways
memory can be inaccurate and erroneous).
191. Written statement of Joanna Donbeck, 2008 Graduate of CUNY Sch. of Law (Jan. 29,
2008) (on file with author). In embracing the Intentionality framework and making
fewer assumptions about brain function and human behavior, Ms. Donbeck placed
importance on the work of Schacter, supra note 190, at 182–203.
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III. INTENTIONALITY—A METACOGNITIVE FRAMEWORK
TO MITIGATE THE EFFECTS OF DEFAULT HUMAN
BEHAVIOR
The Intentionality framework is a metacognitive process that
involves examining one’s thoughts to compensate for erroneous
default thinking and behavioral habits. Metacognition, the scientific
study of methods of examining one’s thought processes, encourages
intentional mental behaviors that can be used to improve the quality
of one’s thinking by examining thoughts about one’s internal mental
representations. 192 Thus, the concept of “internal monitoring” is
central to the Intentionality framework and any metacognitive
process.
The Intentionality framework provides teachers, students, and
lawyers with a method to embed an internal monitor that prompts us
to resist default thinking and to be better problem solvers. By
frequently making it a point to internally check in within oneself and
by cultivating the habit of self-awareness and questioning one’s basic
assumptions, lawyers will be better fact gatherers who are able to
communicate more effectively and accurately understand others in
helping them achieve their goals. Critical components to practicing
Intentionality are the internal focus and deliberate monitoring of
thoughts for assumptions and language choice, consciously choosing
our communication profile in the full range of activities in working
professionally with others, and deliberately reflecting. 193 The
192. See Douglas J. Hacker, Definitions and Empirical Foundations, in METACOGNITION IN
EDUCATIONAL THEORY AND PRACTICE 3 (Douglas J. Hacker et al. eds. 1998); John
Flavell, Metacognition Theory, THEORIES LEARNING EDUC. PSYCHOL.,
http://www.lifecircles-inc.com/Learningtheories/constructivism/flavell.html
(last
visited May 12, 2011); see also John H. Flavell, Metacognitive Aspects of Problem
Solving, in THE NATURE OF INTELLIGENCE 231, 232 (Lauren Resnick ed., 1976); JOHN
H. FLAVELL, THE DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY OF JEAN PIAGET 41 (1963); John H.
Flavell, First Discussant's Comments: What Is Memory Development the
Development of?, 14 HUM. DEV. 272, 277 (1971); John H. Flavell, Metacognition and
Cognitive Monitoring: A New Area of Cognitive-Developmental Inquiry, 34 AM.
PSYCHOLOGIST 906 (1979); John H. Flavell, Speculation About the Nature and
Development of Metacognition, in METACOGNITION, MOTIVATION, AND
UNDERSTANDING 21 (F. Weinert & R. Kluwe eds., 1987).
193. I evolved my “Intentionality” framework over many decades of study, practice, and
internal reflections. This framework is not novel thinking. One can turn to multiple
religious, spiritual, and philosophical doctrines and find a variety of contemplative
models that contain similar orientations and practices. Dr. Don Miguel Ruiz, a
Mexican shaman, teaches a model containing similar steps to self-knowledge and how
to reduce self-delusion. See DON MIQUEL RUIZ & JANET MILLS, THE FOUR
AGREEMENTS COMPANION BOOK 102 (2000). What is novel is my perspective that
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Intentionality framework provides a recursive, three-stage
metacognitive process to successfully accomplish the goal of
resisting default thinking.
A. Intentionality Framework
Stage 1) Internal Intention to External Attention:
This stage of forethought is the means for exercising control over
one’s individual judgment through metacognition. In other words,
we focus our internal attention by looking at the quality of our
reasoning. We do this by testing our assessment by identifying both
our emotions and our logic that we hear ourselves think internally.
Of course, this requires developing the capacity to hear and indentify
our emotional thoughts as well as our analytical thoughts. 194 Thus, I
emphasize the lawyer’s development of the ability to hear both their
emotional thoughts as well as their reasoning. In reality, this is how
any self-correcting individual is able to check the accuracy of their
understanding of meaning in any communication. 195 The influence of
the lawyer in all lawyering activity is so powerful that we must be
able to routinely self-monitor how we are constructing meaning in
order to achieve the desired outcomes in the specific matter.
Effective lawyers should be able to validate the content of their
own emotional thoughts through vetting their attitudes and reactions.
Thinking about both our emotional and analytical thinking makes us
accountable for what we say and plan to do. This is a deliberative
stage where the lawyer focuses on critically listening to his or her
thoughts. The lawyer works with these thoughts to understand his or
her own emotional content and to question the quality of his or her
judgments. All of this forethought occurs prior to the stage of
externalizing one’s attention to creating a plan. In this first stage of
forethought, the lawyer is focusing on developing his or her intention
as a result of his or her internal focus.
Metacognitive capacity reduces distortion in individual
judgment. 196 This capacity or internal reflection framework enables
the individual to think about the quality of his or her thoughts and
how that thinking impacts on his or her actions in the external
reflective self-awareness about the dynamics of human behavior should be integrated
into legal problem-solving.
194. See Blaustone, supra note 92, at 266–67.
195. See id.
196. See Anthony S. Niedwiecki, Lawyers and Learning: A Metacognitive Approach to
Legal Education, 13 WIDENER L. REV. 33, 44–45 (2006).
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world. 197 To clarify, the lawyer examines the quality of his or her
internal emotional and analytical reasoning. Examples of this selfaware internal focus include hearing our emotions and judgments in
our reasoning, identifying what needs further inquiry, and testing our
initial assessments. This can be understood as a form of self-editing
designed to accomplish the goal. Once we have done the internal
work, then we can effectively engage in the external attention and
thereafter engage in both at the same time. This internal intention
guards against mindless reactions. 198 This stage of forethought on our
internal monitoring explicitly acknowledges our reactions and our
default thinking. This forethought allows us the opportunity to
modify our assessment before starting to implement our plan. This
improves the quality of any potential problem-solving that will occur.
Paying attention to this stage of forethought in the formation of our
intention can make the difference between a good idea implemented
well and a good idea implemented poorly.
Poor implementation of a good idea is often a worse consequence
than no action at all. Thus, using the Intentionality framework
differentiates in the quality of the implementation of a good idea. In
this stage of forethought directed at our intention, the lawyer focuses
on identifying the content of his or her reaction and surfaces his or
her underlying concern that gives rise to the reaction. 199 Surfacing
his or her underlying concern, the lawyer is then in a position to
choose to generate a plan that addresses the core concern. This stage
of deliberate forethought in examining our intention precedes the
lawyer’s external attention and subsequent actions.
Stage 2) External Attention to Action:
In this second stage of the Intentionality framework, the lawyer is
self-aware or self-monitoring of his or her intended content, tone, and
delivery when communicating to others. The lawyer successfully
practices the second stage of Intentionality by simultaneously
attending to both this internal agenda as well to the thought processes
of the other individuals. The practice of this second stage at any
given point of external attention is a streaming process of back and
forth attention and is thus recursive. In other words, attention here is

197. See Hacker, supra note 192, at 10.
198. See Erika Summers-Effler, The Micro Potential for Social Change: Emotion,
Consciousness, and Social Movement Formation, 20 SOC. THEORY 41, 50 (2002).
199. See Blaustone, supra note 92, at 266.
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an unending component of awareness in performance rather than one
effort at one time. 200
In this second stage of Intentionality, the lawyer deliberately pays
attention to word choice, tone, and method of delivery. The lawyer
does so because of the importance of being as accurately understood
and perceived as possible. When the lawyer acknowledges the
existence of default misunderstanding as explained earlier, the lawyer
is more motivated to pay attention to one’s own delivery and
language choice in carrying out all tasks in working with others. 201
Stage 3) Action to Reflection:
The deliberate act of reflection allows the lawyer to identify what it
is that he or she learned from the two stages of forethought to
intention and paying external attention to action. Reflecting on the
quality of the first two stages of Intentionality informs and improves
similar actions in the future. Deliberate reflection provides the basis
for making future choices that are more effective and less costly in
accomplishing similar goals in the future.
Reflection is not a mindless rationalization process for justifying
performance. Quite the opposite, reflection provides a way for the
lawyer to know why choices were made and to draw lessons that will
improve future performance. 202 The ability to reflect is a cornerstone
of Intentionality because it is the means by which the master
practitioner is capable of learning how to avoid responding the same
way in the future. The ability to reflect on performance requires

200. See Mary Ellen Kondrat, Who Is the “Self” in Self-Aware: Professional SelfAwareness from a Critical Theory Perspective, 73 SOC. SERV. REV. 451, 453–54
(1999).
201. See Blaustone, supra note 92, at 241–43 (discussing the perspective of the lawyer as
one who professionally must effectively work with others in legal problem solving);
see also Susan Bryant, Collaboration in Law Practice: A Satisfying and Productive
Process for a Diverse Profession, 17 VT. L. REV. 459, 459–60 (1993) (discussing the
lack of self-awareness in lawyers’ work styles when working collaboratively); see
also Susan Bryant, The Five Habits: Building Cross-Cultural Competence in Lawyers,
8 CLINICAL L. REV. 33, 56, 70–72 (2001) [hereinafter Bryant, Five Habits] (discussing
“isomorphic attribution” and the lawyer’s intentional listening for connotations—how
words and acts can have different meanings; also discussing the lawyer’s intentional
thinking method of “Parallel Universes” to encourage alternative inferences in the
assessment of accurate understanding of others).
I administer the Myers-Briggs Type Indicator (MBTI) psychological assessment to
law students as a tool to increase self-awareness and to motivate law students to adopt
my Intentionality framework in their professional practice.
202. Beryl Blaustone, Teaching Law Students to Self-Critique and to Develop Critical
Clinical Self-Awareness in Performance, 13 CLINICAL L. REV. 143, 159–60 (2006).
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separation from judging one’s own motivation or character and is
geared towards internal analysis of why difficulties occurred, and
how to plan or strategize how to handle the tasks better next time.
Thus, reflection should be a routine integrated component of thinking
about the lawyer’s performance that assesses the strengths and
weaknesses of the particular task. 203 Reflection is a balanced
assessment geared towards perpetual achievement of mastery in
future lawyering. 204 Reflection is thus the last stage of Intentionality,
which closes the circle and starts the next cycle in the Intentionality
framework.
B. Potential Pitfalls:
A potential pitfall of practicing the Intentionality framework is that
mastery can produce complacency. One might ignore the usefulness
of each stage of Intentionality as they begin to perform each stage by
rote or automatically. However, this tendency need not be a problem
if users of the framework are aware of those situations in which it is
necessary for them to examine their own intentional acts. The
benefits of integrating core concepts of brain function can be
accomplished by the active use of this framework as one part of
conscious-lawyering activity. The imperative to choose to do so is
reinforced by correcting our basic premises about human behavior.
IV. MODELING AND TEACHING INTENTIONALITY IN THE
CLINICAL SUPERVISION CONTEXT.
A. Modeling Stages One and Two of the Intentionality Framework.
Effective clinical supervision requires supervisors to model habits
of Intentionality in lawyering and in their supervision. Effective
supervision requires supervisors to intentionally focus internally on
their combined emotional- and analytical-thinking processes and to
observe the comprehension process of the law student (recipient
other) in their understanding of meaning in communication. The
effective practitioner of the Intentionality framework actively focuses
on the internal intention to resist assumptions about what the other
understands from the supervision encounter. Thus both the clinical
supervisor and the legal intern must deliberately devote attention to
their communication processes, which yield either accurate
comprehension or counterproductive misinterpretation. The student
203. Id. at 159.
204. Id. at 159–60.
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and the supervisor are perceiving, listening, watching, interpreting,
applying metaphors, and sorting into categories—all of which yields
internal meaning of the external communication. This internal
meaning sets the basis for indentifying the tasks, planning, exploring
ambiguities, and selecting the appropriate responses. This means
attorney supervisors should bring the same high level of selfawareness in communication with their legal interns that the attorney
brings in deliberate language choice and deliberate actions with
clients, when counseling, when negotiating, and in all courtroom
activity.
The Intentionality framework 205 focuses on the understanding of
meaning rather than purely on the information exchange. Often,
205. I have synthesized several principles of learning that are the theoretical rationale for
the teaching of a reflective Intentionality framework to law students. This article
addresses two of these principles in text because they more directly reduce distortions
from automatic default human behavior. Another three relevant principles can be
found below:
1. Supervisor’s explicit commitment to student’s capacity.
The teacher or supervisor is explicitly reinforcing the law student’s sense of
competence and responsibility. This means the law teacher or supervisor explicitly
tells the law student that they are capable of learning and performing the specific tasks
assigned. This message encourages the law student’s desire to do better—to do one’s
best—and to strive for excellence in the provision of legal services. Learning theory
and scientific studies support the premise that explicit commitment to the student’s
capacity incentivizes the learning process. The act of being explicit about the
student’s capacity and responsibility helps move the legal intern from the role of
student to the role of novice attorney—bearing responsibility for the welfare of the
client.
2. Supervisor’s explicit commitment to the joint responsibility for student learning.
This premise refers to the explicit contracting discussion between law student and
supervisor or teacher about the assigned tasks, objective goals of the work, and
specific learning goals for the student. However, more is intended. This premise also
refers to the supervisor or teacher making the effort to explicitly communicate his or
her commitment to shared responsibility for the student’s learning. The act of doing
so conveys to the law student that he or she is an active partner with the supervisor or
teacher in the student’s goal of acquiring lawyering competency. Implicitly, the
student comprehends that he or she is not alone in the professional quest to become a
competent lawyer. This message also implicitly conveys to the student that he or she
bears primary responsibility for actually transitioning to the role of competent lawyer,
and, thus is expected to be proactively accountable for all activity in the assigned
matter.
3. Self-generated observations promote learning & ownership.
The act of taking initiative in the reflection process generates more momentum by the
student to take on more responsibility in conducting the assigned legal task. Taking
the lead in assessing their own performance of assigned tasks gives law students a
sense of control and safety because they comprehend the actual professional learning
goals of the assessment discussion or engagement with the supervisor. Further, the
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clinical supervisors incorrectly believe that information-giving is the
same as generating a common understanding of meaning. Further,
supervisors may often assume that information-giving produces
learning for the law student. From this faulty premise comes the
erroneous assumption that “if I tell you something then you will
understand me the way I intend to be understood.” 206 As a
countermeasure, practicing Intentionality means that the clinical
supervisor must consciously foster shared meaning and actively resist
the automatic human-behavior default shortcuts that generate more
inaccuracies in the way we understand each other. When we take
charge of verifying the understanding of our meaning, we cease to be
reactive victims of misunderstanding. If we model this active
engagement with our law students, we model a practice that embeds
greater capacity in the law student to build more accurate common
understanding of meaning in their future lawyering with the full
range of individuals with whom they will be interacting.
B.

Effective Teaching or Supervision Requires Constant Vigilance
by the Supervisor to Language Choice, Tone, and Delivery.
The Teacher or Supervisor Must Adopt an Approach of Inquiry
and Not Judgment.

If we, as clinical supervisors, consistently listen and probe for the
student’s meaning and thus actively shows the student we are present
with them, we model the very skills they are trying to effectively
practice in their lawyering activity. We reduce predictable distortion
by increasing our vigilance against premature and automatic
judgments. We reduce the amount of default assumptions in our
understanding by taking the time to make explicit the potential
assumptions operating by both the clinical supervisor and the legal
intern. This is accomplished by both the clinical supervisor and the
legal intern asking questions of one another. The clinical supervisor
sets the tone that it is appropriate to be a rigorous fact investigator
and therefore to routinely check his or her understanding of the
communication occurring in the supervision relationship. This
students are less likely to subjectively experience themselves at the total mercy of a
supervisor, who they may anticipate is judging both their capacity and their character.
When the supervisor first engages with the students’ self-generated observations, the
students are less likely to conclude that they are subject to the complete imposition of
the supervisor’s assessment regardless of the law students’ points of view.
206. Bryant, Five Habits, supra note 201, at 52–55; see also Blaustone, supra note 202, at
152.
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proactive approach to actively increase common meaning will
demonstrate to each participant how often there is inaccurate
understanding. Sometimes the inaccuracy will be minimal and
sometimes the inaccuracy will be significant. This process of
checking in with each other and giving each other permission to ask
questions and seek guidance will overtime contribute to the law
student becoming more astute at figuring out when to consult and to
monitor his or her level of accuracy in understanding meaning in the
communication process. Given that the human brain unconsciously
overestimates the depth and accuracy of knowledge—even in the way
we view a photograph—it makes sense to explicitly monitor what we
consciously understand as a product of our shared communications. 207
The supervisor’s attention to tone and delivery establishes a sense of
safety for the student to start reflecting on his or her actual limitations
in sharing joint meaning in professional lawyering practice.
The supervisor is making hard choices not only in tone and
delivery, but also of the substantive focus of reflection in order to
effectively process the issues in performance. We see the vast terrain
of what the student misses and it is difficult to be highly selective of
what is both essential in processing the legal work of the intern and to
also focus on the student’s learning from the performance. In this
process it is quite certain that the supervisor finds it more difficult to
see the vast terrain of what they are missing with the legal intern as
well as in the legal case. The supervisor needs to self-regulate for
awareness of tone, delivery, and assumptions with the goal of keen
attention or focus on what the law student is communicating by
language and behavior. The attention is to what is going on for the
law student in the instant communication rather than on the quick
judgment as supervisor as to what is happening with the student in
the communication process.
C. Modeling and Structuring Normalizes the Reflection Process
Reflection is not an accustomed exercise or habit of the novice
attorney. Modeling and structuring a reflection process—including a
feedback process on performance—normalizes the reflection process
as an integral part of the attorney’s professional attention to capable
self-awareness. 208 Reflection should be regarded as a regular, normal
component of the supervision discussion and of the assessment of the

207. Blaustone, supra note 202, at 152–53; see also Fragale & Heath, supra note 58, at
226–27.
208. See generally Blaustone, supra note 202, at 159–60.
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actions taken in a case. 209 As such, the law student experiences it as a
less risky encounter instead of being an unpleasant discussion, which
only happens when problems arise in a specific circumstance.
Modeling regular reflection that covers key productive and
counterproductive aspects of the student’s performance as a normal
component of how a lawyer thinks is modeling proactive professional
self-correction. 210 This is a productive countermeasure to the
common experience that reflection is simply a random afterthought
that happens only at uncomfortable and spontaneous intervals.
Lastly, when teachers or supervisors consistently model and provide
structure for reflection, there is less likelihood that the teacher or
supervisor’s input is full of subjective judgment made worse by the
objective fact that the student perceives meaning through the actual
framework of the power imbalance in the supervisor or teacher to
student or intern relationship.
Modeling and structuring reflection produces explicit articulation
of the expectations about this engagement. Expectations become
known and are not a surprise for the student. The positive
consequence is that there is less room for misinterpretation of the
supervisor’s intent by the student. Explicit expectations about
debriefing performance and discussing expectations promote a sense
of safety for the law student in their transition from student to novice
attorney. 211 A sense of safety does not mean that the student is
protected from performance anxiety and the fears of failure and
judgment. It means that the student is flying with a safety net and
that falling will not result in irreparable harm. Transparency, or the
intentional elevation from implicit to explicit meaning, is the thread
that forms the safety net. If this becomes the norm in the supervision,
then the safety net becomes stronger and the student flies higher—
taking on a more professional role and accountability. All of the
above points suggest that before we ask students to engage in their
reflection with us, it is fundamentally necessary for the teacher or
supervisor to explicitly instruct on reflection and to model their own
repetitive self-correction as a normal part of the master practitioner’s
continual personal and professional growth. 212 This modeling yields
the profound lesson for the law student of becoming more
comfortable with uncertainty and complexity as familiar realities in

209.
210.
211.
212.

Id.
Blaustone, supra note 202, at 161–62.
Id. at 153–54, 162.
Id. at 161.
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which lawyers are expected to successfully solve problems. 213
Perhaps this process will become less scary for the student because
we regularly demonstrate that we experience both mistakes and
achievements and greater abilities and misjudgments in the
performance of our lawyering activities. Success is the result of the
fuller capacity to self-correct and to replicate our achievements as we
move into our next assignments. 214 Lastly, the law student benefits
from the supervisor’s modeling of calm leadership in the urgent
circumstances of legal representation. The student repeatedly
experiences that certain forms of reflection produce the capacity to
remain calm and take effective measures in the unanticipated reality
of the present performance. 215
Intensive repetition of reflective practice allows the student to
create a framework for future legal problem-solving and professional
development. 216 Repetition anchors or embeds the learning. The law
student experiences the repeated process that self-learning is a big
part of being a lawyer. The teacher or supervisor devotes time to
repeating reflection skills with the student because random attention
to reflection and assessment does not establish routine capacity or
habit. This opportunity to practice repetition of reflection skills
creates the possibility of the student achieving mastery in the use of
the Intentionality framework.
V. CONCLUSION
Human beings should understand themselves better as selfregulating, thinking actors who are able to deliberately take into
account the functioning defaults inherent in our thinking processes. 217
To do this, we must cultivate self-awareness and constantly monitor
our thought process to ensure accurate understanding and to guard
against erroneous default behavior or construction of meaning. By
listening critically to our thoughts and hearing our emotions and
judgments in our reasoning, we are better able to identify what needs
further inquiry and to test our initial assessments. We are also better
able to self-monitor and construct accurate shared meaning when
communicating with others; through the process of reflection, we
continually build on our capacity to achieve these goals. By
213.
214.
215.
216.
217.

Id. at 155, 162.
See id. at 159.
See id. at 152–53, 155.
Id. at 159.
Hacker, supra note 192, at 10 (citing R.H. Kluwe, Cognitive Knowledge and
Executive Control: Metacognition, in ANIMAL MIND—HUMAN MIND 222 (D.R. Griffin
ed., 1982)).
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understanding human behavior and adopting the Intentionality
framework, law teachers will have a better understanding of how
students learn, and can teach students how to more effectively
practice.
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